behaviourist assumptions, formal surveys or rational-choice models tell us little about the qualitative dimensions of elite cultures, the webs of informal rules and social relations, or the insiders' perspectives that shape the worlds of top officials. Most anthropologists would agree with this argument, or at least the anti-positivist sentiment behind it. 2 Anthropology as a discipline is concerned with worlds of meaning and subjectivity; it is fundamentally humanistic and reflexive in its attempt to understand and deconstruct those realms of human experience and intentionality and the social actions that derive from them. As Malinowski (1965 Malinowski ( [1922 p. 517) expressed it long ago, our aim is to understand what the world looks like from the 'native's point of view'; to grasp 'his outlook on things, his Weltanschauung, the breath of life and reality which he breathes and by which he lives.' That goal is as pertinent for the study of policy professionals in complex European bureaucracies as it is for villagers in the remote islands of Melanesia. However, where there is less agreement is in the problematic question of how we should study these policy elites and their worlds, and what theories or methods provide the most effective tools for analyzing the more intimate spaces of elite life?
Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork among EU civil servants in Brussels, this chapter explores some of the epistemological and methodological challenges that confront us when we try to study EU officials 'up close and personal'. More specifically, I examine how perspectives gleaned from symbolic anthropology (notably Clifford Geertz and Victor Turner) can help shed light on the character of the European Commission and its so-called 'organizational culture'. While qualitative researchers in political science have increasingly turned to Geertz's work for inspiration (Chabal and Daloz, 2006) , I suggest that Turner's approach offers a more useful framework for analyzing elite cultures. My aim, however, is not to engage in introverted disciplinary debates over the relative merits of these two symbolic anthropologists. Rather, I
simply want to highlight the importance of going beyond semiotics and 'thick description' by focusing on performance, ritual process and boundary maintenance behaviour, themes central to Turner's work. Doing fieldwork in Brussels I discovered that elite life among European civil servants is highly ritualistic, performative, and concerned with boundaries (a fact reflected in the many turf wars for prestige and power between the different Directorates). EU officials, it seemed, were daily 'performing' European integration in a literal as well as metaphorical sense.
There is a wider context that should be mentioned here. Ever since the allegations of fraud and corruption that led to the resignation of the Santer Commission on 15 March 1999, the 'culture' of the Commission has become an issue of major importance for both EU scholars and policy-makers (Cini, 2001) . A key question often raised is how do we explain the extraordinary levels of cronyism and mismanagement documented by the European Court of
Auditors and the Committee of Independent Experts (CIE, 1999; Macmullan, 1999; Shore, 2005) ? Even before the scandal of 1999, the Commission's 'organizational culture' had become a subject of considerable theoretical importance (Ludlow, 1992; Edwards and Spence, 1994; Page, 1997) . For many integration theorists, the success of the EU's project hinges on its capacity to forge a new kind of European identity among its staff. The 'functional integration'
of European officials and politicians within the EU's organizational milieu has long been seen as an essential ingredient for creating a distinctly European civil service (Mitrany, 1966 The role that European institutions play in shaping consciousness and identity continues to be debated, but whether one subscribes to this theory or not, the EU's civil service can clearly be construed as a microcosm (and 'macrocosm') for the wider integration project (Peterson, 1997) . The question of the Commission's 'culture' has understandably become a compelling concern for EU analysts and policy professionals. If Europe cannot achieve unity here at the 'heart of Europe', what hope is there of forging such unity beyond Brussels and among
Europe's population at large? Do the social relations being forged within the EU's institutions offer glimpses of the possibilities (or limits) of European integration in general?
What is 'Symbolic Anthropology'? Why 'Thick Description' is not enough Symbolic anthropology refers to a variety of different approaches the central theme of which is that 'culture' can be studied as a relatively autonomous entity, or a system of shared meanings that we attempt to unravel through the decoding and interpretation of key symbols and rituals Spencer, 1996) . A second core assumption is that people's actions are guided by perspective achieved through a 'restless oscillation between minutiae and generalization', or 'experience near' and 'experience far' (Geertz, 1983 ).
Geertz's approach, which he defines as 'essentially a semiotic one', aims at understanding a culture through the study of signs and their meanings. Most action, he argues, is symbolic in nature, or infused with symbolic meaning. For Geertz, a culture is not some kind of superorganic level of reality, nor is it something located 'in the minds and hearts of men' or in the invisible rules of language and taxonomies (Geertz 1973, p.11) . Rather, it is the sum of all the different codes used to convey meaning within a particular group. These are the 'webs of significance' upon which all human experience is 'suspended' (Geertz 1973, p.5) . The object of a study of meaning is to grasp not simply 'the native's point of view', but rather the 'interpretations to which people of a particular denomination subject their experience ' (1973, p.15) . This is a subtle but important distinction. Geertz's stance is less an attempt to understand how the world is seen as how it is 'seen to be seen'. This idea is based on the acknowledgement that anthropological interpretations are inevitably at two or more degrees of separation from that which they interpret; i.e. our interpretations of their interpretations:
Doing ethnography is like trying to read (in the sense of "construct a reading of") a manuscript -foreign, faded, full of ellipses, incoherencies, suspicious emendations, and tendentious commentaries (Geertz 1973, p.10) .
While interpretive anthropology can provide wonderfully evocative accounts of public events and the symbolic worlds that people inhabit, its dependence on textual metaphors, literary devices and highly subjective interpretations leads to some major shortcoming in its theory of culture and in its representations of 'meaning'. Geertz's ethnographic accounts often blur into narrative fictions (Crapanzano, 1986 ) and his 'thick descriptions' are curiously 'thin' when it comes to portraying real individuals or representing himself. There is little genuine reflexivity in Geertz ethnography; just enough to establish the authenticity of the author's presence before he disappears from the narrative account. Interpretive anthropology claims to provide a window into the very 'ethos' of a cultural system; that what we observe in public rituals is the externalization of private sensibilities. But whose meanings are being portrayed in these interpretive accounts and who is to say that this is how the people themselves see or interpret their world (Schneider, 1987; Scholte, 1986) ? How do we satisfy the demands for 'verification' that the insights gained from fieldwork are not simply the fruit of hearsay, subjective bias or fanciful speculation?
This problem of 'verification' was one that I encountered repeatedly during fieldwork when trying to explain my research to EU officials (many of whom had their own convictions about how to conduct social research). As one senior official caustically remarked following my attempts to explain the ethnographic approach; 'so anthropology is really just anecdotal. How can you prove anything when your research method is simply personal experience?' This 'burden of proof' issue becomes even more troublesome when we 'study up' and try to gain access to the private worlds of public officials. To anthropologists it may seem axiomatic that much of the official behavior observed in institutional settings is ritual and symbolic in nature, but to the officials concerned such a proposition may be anything but obvious. The self-image of Western bureaucracy rests precisely on a classificatory system that pits its own inherent 'rationality' against the disorderly and irrational 'Other' (Herzfeld, 1992 to see performances of ritual as distinct phases in the social processes whereby groups became adjusted to internal changes and adapted to their external environment (Turner, 1967, p.20) .
These themes of 'adaptation', 'performativity', and symbols as vehicles for shaping action and moving people between social states are hallmarks of Turner's approach. Ritual symbols, he argues, perform three functions: they condense objects and actions into a single formation; they unify disparate meanings, and they also polarize meanings -typically between 'ideological and 'sensory' realms (Turner, 1967, p. 28) . Al ritual symbols, Turner proposes, are 'collective representations' that stimulate emotion and 'channel desires and feeling' according to the 'norms and values that guide and control persons as members of social groups and categories' (Turner, 1968, pp. 28-29) . So how does one recognize those particularly salient symbols that underpin a society? Turner's answer is that a dominant symbol 'encapsulates the major properties of the total ritual process' (Turner 1967, p. 30) , and that the structure and properties of these can be inferred from three classes of data: (1) external form and observable characteristics; (2) interpretations offered by specialists and laymen; (3) significant contexts, which are largely worked out by the anthropologist (Turner 1967, p. 20) .
It is the second step that most differentiates Turner from Geertz. Whereas Geertz moves directly from thick description -via erudite philosophical musings -to general analysis and exegesis, Turner invites us to give serious consideration to the different interpretations of lay and expert observers and to the contexts in which action occurs. His third step goes beyond the first and second and may even contradict them. Like Geertz, he contends that explanation does not lie at the level of the actors' frame of reference and that the best interpretation of a symbol or cultural practice is not necessarily the one you get from the 'native's point of view'. But this begs a deeper epistemological question: When anthropologists interpret the 'meaning' of a ritual, whose interpretations are these -the anthropologists', their native informants and ritual specialists, or the lay individuals participating in the ritual itself (Sperber, 1975; Spencer, 1996) ? Who is to say 'they are wrong: this is the explanation?' Turner's answer, which he demonstrates using the example of puberty rituals, is that Ndembu informants are often unable to recognize the contradictions in their own accounts, and that it takes a professional observer to infer the way symbols connect with the wider social contexts in which they are situated.
To argue that it takes a professional outsider with a more holistic view to discern the 'wood from the trees' in the metaphorical 'forests of symbols' might seem uncontentious when applied to the culture of pre-literate tribal peoples, but can we apply such reasoning to government officials and policy-professionals? What kind of interpretive lens is appropriate for analyzing the 'culture' of a civil service? In what follows, I explore how symbolic anthropology can help us understand the culture of the EU civil service. In many respects the fieldwork process was for me a kind of 'rite of passage' not dissimilar to the ritual process described by Turner. As I hope to show, my own journey into the world of EU officials helped me to understand what 'Europeanization' means in this complex bureaucratic milieu, and how it is that officials become socialized into the norms and practices of the EU's administration.
Studying the 'Tribes of Europe': Reflections on Fieldwork and Method
My initial interest in the EU civil service had little to do with rituals or symbolism. In 1992 I began work on a study the European Community's emerging 'cultural policy'; that cluster of 'cultural actions' and information initiatives funded by the European Parliament that were aimed at promoting the Community's external image and identity. While carrying out that research, however, I came across the 'People's Europe' campaign and what appeared to be a 'hidden history' of European Community attempts to invent new symbols for Europe, from 'harmonized' passports, postage-stamps and driving licenses to the new EU logo, flag and anthem (Adonnino, 1985; Shore, 1996) . Having studied the history of nation-state formation and the work of historians on 'invented traditions' (Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983; Anderson, 1983; Gellner, 1983) I recognized the significance of what was at stake here. What fascinated me was not only what these symbols signified, but the assumptions (or rationality) that had given rise to their invention in the first place. I also wanted to explore how officials justified the need for creating European symbols and their blatant use of PR and marketing techniques, and how they saw themselves within this process of social engineering. From analyzing EU policies aimed at 'Europeanizing' the masses, it seemed logical to examine how EU elites themselves were being Europeanized. The absence of official backing had advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand it meant that I was not granted free and unlimited access to officials or their meetings, but on the other hand it gave me complete independence and autonomy. This was particularly important.
Shortly before I arrived in Brussels to conduct fieldwork, the Commission's 'Cellule de Prospective' -the 'think tank' created by president Jacques Delors and headed by Jerôme
Vignon -had employed a team of anthropologists (two French and one British), to investigate 'the existence or not of specific Commission culture' and to look at the 'weight of different languages and national cultural traditions and their impact on working relationships, and how a
European identity might emerge in such a context' (Abélès et al., 1993, p. 1) . Whereas members of that team had to overcome staff suspicions that they had been sent to spy on the 13 organization, I at least had no such baggage. However, identifying myself as an 'anthropologist' brought other problems. Typically, it provoked bemusement or jokes about coming to 'darkest Brussels' to study 'the tribes of Europe'. I eventually gave up my introducing myself as an anthropologist in favor of the more acceptable label of 'social scientist', although that then led several informants to ask me 'what hypothesis' was I testing and where was my questionnaire?
Gaining familiarity with the organization took time. I rented an office in a building occupied by several national research councils in Rue de la Loi, at the heart of the European Quarter of Brussels. One of my colleagues (a professional lobbyist), memorably described the Commission as 'like a giant fish-tank' and herself as 'an outsider with her nose pressed against the glass, wondering what's going on inside'. In my own case, I did manage to get beyond the glass exterior. The snowballing method worked well and I made friends as well as helpful acquaintances. I also joined a number of staff associations (including the Commission squash club), which gave me access to a network that spanned the different divisions -and an excuse to meet officials outside of the workspace.
Inside the Commission
In the Commission's neo-classical nomenclature the major directorates (which by 1996 had grown to some twenty three) were designated by Roman numerals. My research focused mainly on two Directorate-Generals (or 'DGs'); the first (DGX) was responsible for Culture, the second (DGIX) for Administration. DGIX had been recommended to me on the grounds that staff in this large, Francophone and most traditional of directorates 'knew where the bodies are buried'. Whereas DG X was a popular albeit politically minor unit, DG IX was described as a backwater; the 'graveyard of careers' and a place where 'people were sent and never returned'.
Within the DGs, staff are ranked hierarchically and labeled according to function. 'A' grades are university educated, perform 'conceptual' work and are the highest paid; 'B' grades are technicians and administrators; 'C' grades (by far the largest category and composed overwhelmingly of Belgian and Italian nationals) are secretarial and support staff, and 'D' grades are mainly security guards, van drivers, porters ('huissiers') and tea persons. Among all grades promotions are allegedly based on merit and posts are filled irrespective of nationality.
Reference to 'national quotas' was something of a taboo within the Commission. Yet in practice many sensitive senior positions were 'reserved' for particular nationalities (these were described as 'carrying a national flag'; for example, the Director-Generals for Administration and Agriculture were reputedly 'always French'). Member-state governments kept a keen eye on the relative number of 'A' grades, and 'respecting geographical balance' was the accepted euphemism for the de facto national quota system in operation. 'The Commission is a career civil service only up to level 4 of the A grade', I was told. Promotion beyond that requires political allies and strong national support. The practice of placing national appointees into A1
and A2 positions ('parachutage' as it was termed) was a complaint I often heard, particularly from union officials. Jacques Delors was allegedly 'notorious for abusing the system, for ensuring that his henchmen commanded all the key posts' and individuals who got in his way were either metaphorically 'killed', or shunted into the 'voi de garage' ('parking lot').
Three other factors were typically emphasized by staff when explaining the unusual character of the Commission: it's independence from national government, its 'uniqueness' as a form of public administration, and its small size given the complexity and scope of its tasks. 'Our job', I was often told, 'is to uphold the interests of the Community as a whole'. 'Community' in the strict sense meant the European institutions and acquis communautaire, but was often used generally to refer to the EU and its citizens as a whole. The idea of standing 'above' the parochialism of national governments and promoting the wider 'European interest', together with the belief that working in the EU somehow 'de-nationalized' individuals were recurring themes in the way officials talked about themselves. All of these ideas were epitomized in the concept of 'supranationalism' and in the normative assumptions that underpinned the Commission's legal status as an independent 'supranational' body.
The Commission's role is to draft proposals for new European laws but it is also the EU's executive arm responsible for implementing decisions of Parliament and the Council, managing the EU's day-to-day business, implementing its policies, running its programmes and spending its funds. This unusual bundling of tasks also contributes to the Commission's sense of 'uniqueness' and its claim to being an administration without precedent or parallel in history. That belief fuelled the strong sense of 'mission' that informed the way many staff saw their role. One of the appeals of being an EU fonctionnaire, officials often conceded, was the feeling of 'making history'; of being a 'pioneer' and part of the wider project of European construction ('la constructione européene'). 5 Not everyone expressed such idealism, however;
for many the attractions of joining the EU civil service had more to do with the high status, job security and extremely generous salaries enjoyed by EU fonctionnaires. Nonetheless, as Willis (1982) observed two decades earlier, most European civil servants were self-selected and shared a strong sense of commitment to the 'European ideal'.
Finally, its small size and cosmopolitan character were two other distinguishing features of the Commission. Despite popular stereotypes about a vast organization run by an army of anonymous bureaucrats, the Commission's day-to-day running is done by a small (and surprisingly accessible) staff of administrators, experts, translators, interpreters and secretaries, numbering some 20,000 ('less than the total number employed by the city council of Barcelona or Cardiff' I was often told). This small size has led to a common 'insider's' view of the Commission as a compact, efficient, dynamic organization; 'a lean machine' composed of 'Europe's brightest and best' (Williamson, 1994, p. 25 under cover of darkness, shift-working dressed in safety clothing and protective masks were working overtime to clear the building of its carcinogenic contamination. Not a very good symbol for Europe is it', she beamed; 'the "cancer at the heart of Europe".
European Integration and 'Engrenage': Performance or Ritual Process?
To summarize all that I learned about the Commission's 'organizational culture' is beyond the scope of this chapter. 6 However, after a few months several key themes emerged. The first was evidence of a strong esprit de corps and shared consciousness-of-kind among staff. This was reflected in the frequent use of 'house' metaphors when referring to the Commission (another key symbol and boundary marker), the constant use of 'We' or 'We in the House' when referring to fellow Commission staff, and the EU's shared, semi-private language composed of in-house phrases, bureaucratic acronyms and hybridized francophone neologisms (such as 'going en missione' or 'holding a tour de table'). Although many officials would often describe their work as routine and bureaucratic ('just like any public administration') the uniqueness of the organization and its mission were often stressed. The 'Euro-idealism' of the early generation of European officials may have waned (Ludlow, 1992) There is no career management, personnel development or grading and promotion structure here: once you're 'in' it is every man for himself. There is a system of twoyearly staff reports, but these consist of a derisory set of boxes to be ticked. To get ahead in your career you have to be an entrepreneur; play the game, make use of contacts. Unless you have patronage and a network of personal contacts you're not going to get there. So there is a lot of disenchantment among older staff who haven't been promoted. 7 So how do new staff get inducted into the 'House'? I asked.
That develops through daily exposure to life in the institution. Working here changes people. You learn to make compromises, to cooperate, to look at problems and their solutions from a European perspective. I've seen it happen all the time. Even the most ardent nationalists become engrenagé after six month in the job.
I cannot recall the first time I heard the word 'engrenage' being used in this context;' but over the next few months I became increasingly aware of its strategic importance, not only as local metaphor for describing how new staff get caught up in the Commission's 'way of doing things' (i.e. socialized into the Brussels milieu) , but equally as theory of identity formation among European elites and an explanation of the process by which seconded national experts, politicians and technocrats come to redirect their loyalties towards the EU and its institutions.
In its literal sense 'engrenage' translates as 'gearing' (in the sense of 'cogs in a wheel'), but as I found, it had become a common idiom among EU staff to describe the transformative process by which national officials (including lobbyists and journalists) come to acquire the mental habits and practices of 'Europeans'.
Warming to my discovery, I pursued this theme in further conversations. For EU officials, it seemed, engrenage was clearly a 'dominant symbol' in the sense implied by Turner (1967) . It not only embodied the 'European idea' but also described the mechanism that linked individual participants to the wider ritual process of 'European integration' itself; 8 namely, the journey through which individuals become 'enmeshed' or 'entangled' in the EU's 'web of meanings'.
One Commission official I interviewed had even written a book about this phenomenon explaining how British Eurosceptic Labour MEPs, once elected to the European Parliament, rapidly became enthusiastic EU supporters. He called his theory 'Cotta's Law' (Westlake, 1994) . However, when I asked him whether 'Cotta's Law' also applied to Commission officials like himself he seemed genuinely caught off guard. His reply was that engrenage didn't really apply to A-grade officials because they were 'already committed to the cause' and had 'already demonstrated their belief' by joining the Commission.
Initial findings thus confirmed what integration theorists had long predicted; that the EU's institutions are indeed catalysts for promoting cohesion among national officials and for engendering a distinctly European ethos and identity. The idea of engrenage is consistent with the 'Monnet Method' of European integration; integration understood as a steady incremental process of 'functional spillover'. Monnet's approach was to initiate an 'action trap' in which once actors embark on a specific course of action (for example, the harmonization of regulations necessary for creating the Single European Market, or economic and monetary union) they find themselves obliged to take further actions which take them in directions they did not necessarily intend to go.
It is unclear whether the term engrenage entered the lexicon of EU officials via Monnet's writings or those of EU academics, but as I later discovered, it has also been used to describe processes of socialization among officials in other EU institutions, including the Council of
Ministers.
There is a shared culture in the Council, in spite of the public and publicized tensions and agonistic positioning. Embedded in informal practices, as well as rooted in formal procedures, this is reinforced by forms of socialization and engrenage … Our study reveals that decision-makers, in spite of their national roots, become locked into the collective process, especially in areas of well-established and recurrent negotiation.
This does not mean that the participants have transferred loyalties to the EU system, but it does mean that they acknowledge themselves in certain crucial ways as being part of the collective system of decision-making. (Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace, 1997, pp.
278-79).
My study also found that officials become 'locked' into a collective process, one that entailed both the creation of a shared 'consciousness of kind' and a transfer of loyalties. However, I
also found that the Commission's emerging supranational political culture, with its informal 22 methods, personal networks and incoherent management, bore little resemblance to the harmonious ideal-type that had been so keenly anticipated at its inception.
The Commission seen from Other Perspectives: Insider, Lay and Expert Views
At this point I am minded Victor Turner's advice that our analysis should consider contrasting lay and specialist interpretations. The work of other anthropologists and EU analysts might appropriately be classified within the category of 'ritual specialist'. The Commission-appointed team led by Marc Abélès explored numerous aspects of Commission life including language use, the relevance of stereotypes, social relations at work, the impact of hierarchy, attitudes towards management, the relevance of North-South differences, and personnel policy. Their main conclusion was that the Commission had no overarching cohesive culture but was composed, instead, of a diversity of competing cultures constructed on the basis of language, nationality and departmental identities and allegiances that were closely tied to specific policy areas (Abélès et al 1993) . Curiously, their report makes little reference to the consequences likely to result from this, or to the history of the organization and its enduring legacies; instead we are presented with an image of the Commission as an heroically disorganized, cosmopolitan entity based on a plethora of compromises that have been shaped by departmental loyalties, key personalities and intra-DG turf-war over prestige and resources.
The Abélès study echoes sentiments about the Commission heard frequently in the field: 'the surprising thing about the Commission is not that it works well, but that it should work at all'.
Bramwell's study, although based on research carried out in the 1980s, also depicts an organization cut through by difference, contradictory management regimes and intra- British counterparts over the groaning dinner tables, utterly unconvinced by British charm, puzzled by British refusal to plot against them (Bramwell, 1987, pp. 77-78 ).
Bramwell's observations about the politicization of the service and absence of a coherent human resources policy were echoed in the Committee of Experts report which also drew explicit links between the dysfunctional aspects of the Commission's administrative culture and the prevalence of mismanagement, fraud and corruption.
Two important fieldwork encounters underlined that connection. The first was in 1996 while interviewing a leader from one of the main staffing unions (Union Sindicale). regime with its own salary scales, promotion prospects and procedures' (Spence, 1994, p. 65) .
This is a startling admission. As one of Spence's colleagues remarked that Bernard Connolly, the Commission' former expert on EMU, had been sacked for making far less critical or damaging comments. 9 The Commission's combination of a formal system comprising 'rigid bureaucratic structures' and legal rules and a pervasive 'informal' system based around personal networks and 'flexible' working methods was typically described as a legacy of the French tradition (Spence, 1994, p. 64) . 10 Indeed, many of the problems of mismanagement identified by Spence -including a 'highly politicized senior management closely linked to the party in power', the powerful Cabinet system, and the tendency to 'use information as a constituent element of a bureaucratic and political power base'-originate from the French system of public administration (Spence, 1994, p. 91) . As a result, many dysfunctional practices -from cronyism (or 'piston'), 'parachutage' and posts reserved for certain nationalities, to 'rigged exams', seconding national experts, fly-by-night titular exams and various other back-door recruitment methods -have become virtually institutionalized (Spence, 1994, p. 92 There was a peculiar complicity within the security system and between the Security
Office and other circles in the Commission that created a kind of regulation-free-zone', where existing laws and regulations were regarded as cumbersome barriers to various forms of arbitrary action rather than as rules to be respected. The security system appears to have been undermined by a sub-culture which was characterized by personal relationships, a system of 'give-and-take' and a withdrawal from the overall system of control and surveillance. The question must be asked as to how such a sub-culture could develop, exist and prevail in a section of the European civil service without being detected from within, brought to light only when a newspaper published the allegations' (CIE, 1999, p. 102) .
Conclusions: The Commission in Anthropological Perspective
It would be tempting to try and conclude with a sophisticated exegesis that illuminates the 'deep structures' beneath the enigmatic surface phenomena described above. What I have tried to show instead is that understanding a 'cultural system' -or even an 'administrative system' - Belgian official, 'you should read the history of the middle ages'.
The CIE report asked '[h]ow did such a sub-culture develop and exist … without being detected?' It is certainly curious that, until the scandal broke, virtually none of the many hundreds of policy analysts, journalists or EU scholars had written about the problems of fraud, nepotism and cronyism detailed in the CIE report. How did the internal life of this most public of administrations remain so private? Could it be that such phenomena were invisible to all those pundits and professionals, many of whom owe their reputations -and careers -to their expertise in EU affairs? 'The journalists here are all part of the system', several shrewd officials had said. To echo Upton Sinclair, 'it is difficult to get a man to understand something when his salary depends upon his not understanding it'. Yet part of the explanation for this willing myopia also lies in the systems of classification that European governments use to judge organizational 'rationality' and 'efficiency'. For years, the pragmatic modus operandi of the Commission, with its 'informal practices' and networking dynamics, was not merely tolerated by member-state governments and officials but actually celebrated (Middlemas 1995) . This was the source of the EU's dynamism and efficiency, or so it was argued. What made Delors, Kohl and Mitterrand such celebrated 'European statesmen' was their ability to 'get things done' in order to advance the integration project. The scandal of 1999 showed that those who believe the 'ends justify the means' should also consider the unforeseen consequences that such calculations entail. While the close ties, fluidity and networking within the EU administration rendered it dynamic and flexible and capable of taking enormous initiatives during the Delors era, those same features also engendered an environment that was highly conducive to the kind of informal practices and personal politicking that resulted in the Commission's downfall.
I have also tried to make the case for going beyond 'thick description' and why we need narrative accounts that combine ethnography and personal experience with other kinds of persuasive data, including official reports, archival sources, memoirs and other testimonies.
Turner's work provides a model for how different kinds of viewpoints (both lay and expert)
can be used to triangulate such evidence. This gives a robustness to research findings that is usually absent from interpretive and purely symbolic approaches. It means that when we hear evidence of collusion and corruption that concurs with what local experts and insiders report, our findings cannot so easily be dismissed as subjective, biased or 'merely anecdotal'. Turner also provides a useful model for helping us to identity which symbols are socially significant and why. Rituals, he argues, often function to convert the 'obligatory' into the 'desirable' by aligning ethical and juridical norms with strong emotional stimuli. As he puts it: 'The basic unit of ritual, the dominant symbol, encapsulates the major properties of the total ritual process which bring about this transmutation' (Turner, 1967, p. 30) . As I learned through fieldwork, that alignment of norms and emotional stimuli was potently expressed in the term engrenage, a concept that embodies all of the core elements of the ideology and practice of European integration. 'Supranationalism' was another dominant symbol whose meanings only became evident from a grounded empirical perspective. I found that the term was full of normative assumptions about the EU's 'mission' to rescue Europe from the dark, irrational forces of nationalism by forging a higher political order based on reason, progress, and all those other 
